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Re-viewing Richard Foreman (and Theater of Images) 
Jack Halstead 
Like "jumbo shrimp" and "military intelligence," Richard Foreman's work 
now inhabits an oxymoronic domain, one that can be dubbed the "established 
avant-garde" (perhaps the only avant-garde available in a postmodern culture). 
Having initiated his own peculiar brand of "ontological hysteria" more than two 
decades ago, Foreman continues to produce engaging theater, which allows us 
to take the measure of how the theater and the (now ubiquitous) theorizing 
of performance have changed during the past twenty or so years; if it now 
seems that his work is more conservative, more accessible, it's a little difficult 
to know precisely how much Foreman has changed (admittedly, a good deal) 
and how much our understanding has caught up with him. 
Foreman is a rare breed; unlike the vast majority of American theater 
artists, he is both knowledgeable of and engaged in theory. While the 
contemporary efflorescence of theoretical discourse seems to have outstripped 
him in its sophistication, there is still a lamentable paucity of practitioners who 
theorize with the knowledge and rigor of Richard Foreman. Although his 
practice in recent years-exemplified by such works as The Cure (1986), Film 
Is Evil, Radio is Good (1987), or What Did He See (1988)-has veered away 
from the pure Ontological-Hysteric "style" (described below)~of such works as 
Angelface (1968), Total Recall (Sophia = Wisdom, Part 2) (1971), Pain(T) and 
Vertical Mobility (Sophia = Wisdom, Part 4) (1974), or Pandering to the 
Masses: A Misrepresentation (1975)-that established his reputation in the early 
1970s, much can still be gained by studying his highly-wrought system of 
theory-into-practice. 
Transcending the idea of a Theater of Images, the category in which it is 
usually placed, Foreman's work lays claim to a singular landscape within the 
territorial plurality of postmodern performance. By examining Foreman's 
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methodology-refracted through certain critical concepts from the writings of 
Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida-the distinctiveness of his approach to 
performance is seen to project an alignment with the deconstructive urge of 
poststructuralist critical strategies and to demonstrate the inextricable relation 
of theory to practice which is characteristic of the twentieth century's relativist 
paradigm. 
Post-texts from the Theater of Images 
Unlike the play texts of canonical drama, which-despite any protested 
"respect" with which they may be approached-remain always onfy pretexts (to 
what we make of them in the act of "re-writing," whether in our minds as 
readers, on the pages of our critical commentary, or on the stages of our 
theater), the texts generated out of that style of performance which (in another 
era, it now seems) was called Theater of Images aie post-texts. While it is true 
that these texts, as we read them, are also-like not only everything we read, 
but, indeed, everything we perceive and experience-pretexts to whatever 
subsequent ab/use to which we subject them, and, even though (as we all 
know) the "death" of the authors of these texts has long been proclaimed (their 
intentions counting for nought), still, in encountering one of these texts, 
knowing (as I do) about some of the stated and surmised intentions of these 
theoretically "entombed" authors-especially about the fact that the texts under 
consideration were generated post-production, as more-or-less literary artifacts, 
rather than pre-performance, as authorial guides to production-the new 
"author," I (inescapably revisionist) am nevertheless seduced into a particular 
mode of reading, which differs from how I read a text-as-pretext. More than 
hurled into the future (as they certainly also are), these texts seem to be 
hurled out of the past; and even though I am propelled forward as I turn the 
pages (into the future of the text?), my mind-like Walter Benjamin's "angel 
of history"-is turned to the past. 
Slippery business 
It may be a compulsion peculiar to those who practice performance in the 
tradition of what they (or others for them) consider to be "theater"~which is 
haunted by language as language is haunted by performance-to render their 
work at some stage in literary form, to aim it at the future. Such historico-
literary yearnings notwithstanding, the turning to the past which the post-texts 
of the Theater of Images encourage in their reading has a strong 
correspondence to what may be perceived as a common force motivating the 
creation of theater performance (such as Theater of Images) without a 
governing a priori text. I should immediately acknowledge that while some of 
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what has been called Theater of Images was generated from a priori texts (as 
is the case, for example, with Richard Foreman), the text in these instances 
was not governing in any traditional sense, and that, even in the case of 
practitioners who used no a priori written text, there was of course a sense of 
text (as discourse, as ideology, as language) which-despite their various 
slippery maneuvers-nonetheless "governed" the production of performance. 
It was in the face of this (inevitable?) government by the text that much 
of the Theater of Images flew, motivated at least in part by a desire to 
constitute performance without language, to turn away from language toward 
some conceivable (in language of course) originary spacetime of performance 
existing in polymorphous prelinguicity. Theater of Images dreamed (in 
language of course) of experience-both lived, and, in the theater, re-lived (or 
perhaps pre-lived)—unmediated by language. 
On the surface (and like much of high-and postmodernist art Theater of 
Images was keenly aware of surfaces), Theater of Images appeared to be an 
attempt to slip away from the duplicity of language, which seems to mean, to 
point to something other than language, but may, in the provisional analysis 
of post-structuralist discourse, refer only to itself. In the attempt to construct 
a theatrical experience that slips before, below, beyond, or away from 
language, Theater of Images recognized that language-to paraphrase 
Brecht-"languages everything down." In its substitution of a system of 
primarily visual and aural sensory images, the attempt was to constitute 
performance phenomenologically as a non-lingual or perhaps pre-lingual 
experience. Of course these images, like Wittgenstein's "pictures," are models 
of reality and therefore constructs of language. Even if these images were 
conceived-as many appear to have been-in some pre- or non-lingual altered 
state of (unmediated?) consciousness (if we posit such a state), still, when they 
are offered up to an audience they are (inevitably?) "languaged down," that is, 
they appear-like language-to mean, to signify something, if only 
meaninglessness itself. As Roland Barthes noted: 
Even were a detail to appear irretrievably insignificant, resistant to 
all functionality, it would end up with precisely the meaning of 
absurdity or uselessness: everything has a meaning or nothing has 
(1977:89). 
It is perhaps unfair to apply Barthes' high-structuralist analysis of narrative to 
a style of theater which appears to be motivated in large part by the impulse 
to subvert narrative, to expunge narrative's linearity, literality, and literarity (to 
shamelessly alliterate) from the structure of performance. 
Now, of course, the incorporation of spoken language-used in some guise 
by virtually all Theater of Images practitioners-even if only as aural image or 
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"aural tableaux," as Bonnie Marranca maintains (1977:xiv), unavoidably worked 
against this project. In all fairness to these practitioners, they knew this; the 
diverse strategies of language usage in their pieces invariably tended toward 
the subversion of language, or at least toward the subversion of the innate 
compulsion of Indo-European languages—with their simple linear causality of 
subject-acts-on-predicate—to construct meaning narratively. But even the 
sonorization of autistic utterances by Christopher Knowles in some of Robert 
Wilson's work, in its superficial refusal to signify meaning, only tended to 
frustrate the spectator's mind and prompt it to look elsewhere for significance, 
to glimpse it in the emotional (or vacuously non-emotional) tonality of the 
sonic image, or perhaps to view it in some micro-structural rhythmic 
correlation to the macro-structure of the piece, or perhaps to find it in 
Wilson's "therapeutic" intent. 
If the Theater of Images was not just another example of "artistic dallying 
with forms," that "accursed, truly hellish thing" against which Artaud railed 
(1968:13), then its sustaining value may largely derive from the attempt to 
absent language-in its normal usage-from the stage, by either substituting 
sensory images or subverting spoken language itself. In seeking to break the 
strangle-hold of the linguistically induced linear-causal model of reality that has 
for so long held western theater (not to mention civilization) in its grasp, 
choking experience into language (assuming that the former exists without the 
latter), Theater of Images acted out a contemporary variation, considerably 
watered-down for all its high-tech propping-up, of Artaud's quest to "break 
through language in order to touch life" (1968:13). But if reality is indeed a 
construct of language, then this aspect of the Theater of Images project was 
as impossible as Artaud's; theater cannot slip out of the grasp of language 
without giving the theater-and life itself-the slip. 
Field Theory 
Richard Foreman-who knows that "images alone don't make anything 
new happen" (1976:136)~is that rarity in the American theater, a theater artist 
both knowledgeable of and engaged in theory. Foreman views his theoretical 
considerations as seamlessly continuous with his entire process of practice. As 
he has acknowledged: 
The writing is generated in a certain way which ends up producing 
structures with a form and texture which is the very embodiment of 
the theory and goals which are the "reasons for doing the writing" 
(1985:238). 
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The thought which informs his work is engaged with contemporary issues 
in a broad range of disciplines, from that interplay of philosophy, linguistics, 
and the other human sciences with aesthetics and literary theory which 
comprises current postmodernist discourse, to the realm of contemporary 
scientific inquiry. It is, in fact, from quantum theory that he draws a recurring 
analogy to his work-the field. In quantum physics, as Fritjof Capra points out: 
The classical contrast between the solid particles and the space 
surrounding them is completely overcome. The quantum field is 
seen as the fundamental physical entity: a continuous medium 
which is present everywhere in space. Particles are merely local 
condensations of the field, concentrations of energy that come and 
go, thereby losing their individual character and dissolving into the 
underlying field (1979:196-7). 
In addition to offering many insights into the "form and texture" of his 
performed pieces, the field analogy is helpful in understanding Foreman's 
tightly integrated system of theory-into-practice. Foreman's theater is not 
simply determined by his theory, but—in a profoundly holistic sense, which 
expresses something of the shared etymology of the two words-his theater is 
his theory, transmuted (as in quantum physics) from the conceptual "field" of 
his consciousness into the "concentrations of energy" (or "local condensations 
of the field") which are his produced works. Marranca has noted that Theater 
of Images texts are "incomplete documents of a theatre that must be seen to 
be understood," that "one cannot talk about the works . . . without talking 
about productions" (1977:xi). In Foreman's case, the problematic of looking 
back from the text to the performance is compounded by an insidious tug that 
beguiles us to look still further back to not only the process that generated the 
performance, but to the conceptual field of theory that, in turn, generated that 
generation. Foreman's lamentable "death" notwithstanding, there is something 
in the nature of his texts that lures my attention back to him: he beckons, as 
it were, from the grave. 
A strident critique of this situation suggests itself here. In the 
phallocratie will to power of which theatrical "outeur-ism" smacks, is Foreman 
denying us our own autoerotic pleasure of the text by refusing to roll over and 
play dead? Perhaps. But it is interesting to note the correspondence between 
a kind of text that entices us to look back if not at Origins at least in the 
direction of origination, to a kind of theater that directs our attention if not 
backward-diachronically into our past—then certainly inward—synchronically 
into our own process and structuration of perception and its interface with 
language recognition and formation, that is, to the origination (if not the 
Origin) of meaning in our consciousness. Foreman's work seeks to expose the 
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apparatus of language--not only temporally-oriented aural-verbal language but 
also spatially-oriented visual language—to disclose the mechanism of meaning 
production as a function of language itself. 
While Foreman's work has been categorized as "self-as-content" by 
Theodore Shank in his typology of American alternative theater (1982:159-70), 
it is unique among the other work that Shank includes in this category. It is 
unlike that of Spalding Gray who has reconstituted his autobiography as 
performance, or that of the Squat group, which has foregrounded their exiled 
existence in an urban storefront as the essence of their theater, or (perhaps 
less obviously so) that of Lee Breuer, whose work Bonnie Marranca has 
typified as "self-as-text," creating "with the poet's 'breath'" of "his own life 
spirit" a "thematics of consciousness" (1980:85-7). 
Foreman's work can more accurately be understood as "self-as-process," 
as the structure and function of both his performances and his idiosyncratic 
creative methodology are designed to enact or embody not the theme or 
content of his consciousness but the very process of it, the function of the 
mechanism by which perception and awareness produce meaning and 
constitute the self and the world. His work can be seen to demonstrate the 
isomorphy of structure and function as understood in systems theory. 
According to systems theorist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, 
In the last resort, structure (i.e. the order of parts) and function (i.e. 
the order of processes) may be the very same thing: in the physical 
world matter dissolves into a play of energies, and in the biological 
world structures are the expression of processes (1968:27). 
While systems theory is admittedly a metadisciplinary structuralism of 
science, this collapsing of the structure/function binary, which suggests a 
poststructuralist orientation, is central to Foreman's project, which is-in many 
ways-a deconstructive one. 
With an aesthetics of performance-both theoretic and applied-which is 
fundamentally in alignment with Derrida's deconstructive project to rehabilitate 
writing, to valorize the concept of writing-in an expanded sense of the word, 
the act—against the hegemony of the "living voice" of authentic self-present 
speech in the western phonologocentric tradition, Foreman accepts the process 
of writing itself as the basis of his entire enterprise, an enterprise which begins 
and ends as "writing." 
In his work, Foreman says he seeks to embody 
the underlying and exciting conflict going on in the writing; the 
conflict between the energy of being-in-a-certain stream of stylistic 
discourse, and the energy of having certain ideas I wanted to express 
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BEFORE I had entered and been absorbed by that discursive 
stream. That conflict between "expression," the self-energizing 
environment it creates around the writer vs. the claims of ideas, 
insights or images he-outside of being-in-the writing-wishes to 
communicate . . . that conflict is basic and echoed in many life fields 
other than "writing plays" (1985:239). 
In her description of his rehearsal procedures for Pain(T) and Vertical 
Mobility, Kate Davy quotes Foreman as describing his intention to stage 
"what's going on in my head while Fm writing" (1974:28). This conception of 
the "underlying and exciting conflict" that Foreman has identified in his writing 
(or in his head while writing)--a conflict between the "meaning" that he wishes 
to express, to make present in his writing, and the very nature of language, 
which does not allow for the full presence of meaning-seems to coincide with 
the view of writing held by Jacques Derrida. 
This may be the dis/seminal recognition by a writer that something 
always escapes, slips away, that there is always an unsaid-perhaps 
unsayable-remainder. 
Rather than trying to fill these gaps, or to gloss over them with 
momentum (and he has used a kind of fiendish momentum in his later 
works-beginning with Pandering to the Masses: A Misrepresentation in 1975-to 
deliberately create gaps), Foreman fills his performances with "dissonances, 
disassociation, discontinuity, dehumanization" (1976:147), with "holes" which 
serve to deny any possible illusion of a remainderless whole, of an original, 
final, correct, or "authorized" meaning. 
In a sense, his entire project can be seen as constituting 
writing/performance primarily of differ once, seeking to deny, as it were, the 
poststructuralist critics any opportunity to demonstrate how his texts embarrass 
their own ruling systems of logic, by beating them to the punch and 
deconstructing them himself. As opposed to a self-destructing work of art 
(such as those by Jacques Tingueley), a Foreman piece is a self-deconstructing 
one, a kind of post-Duchampian "ready-unmade."1 
Foreman has acknowledged the impossibility of achieving his purpose. 
As a stalker of différance however, he has developed an intricate process of 
setting traps for that illusive remainder-which he refers to as "truth," in a 
paper entitled "How Truth . . . Leaps (Stumbles) Across the Stage" delivered 
at an Italian Psychoanalytic Association conference on the subject of "The 
Truth" (1985:198-203)~which, if it can't be snared, may at least be tricked into 
"stumbling" and leaving a trace (like a subatomic particle) "as it trips over 
some irregularity in the constructed field" of the art work (1985:200). These 
irregularities are built into his process, and thereby his performances, as "a 
subtle insertion between logic and accident" (1976:68).2 
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In a kind of compression of the famous Artaudian dictum about 
masterpieces, Foreman seeks to situate himself in a position anterior to the 
condition against which Artaud hurled his injunction by employing an aesthetic 
of "No More Mastery." Although he thinks of himself as a writer and 
considers his literary medium to be "plays," his work diverges radically from 
the traditional dualistic model of play-writing/play-producing. Beyond a 
rigorous refusal-at least in his earlier work-to "rewrite" (in the sense of the 
craft he was taught at Yale), Foreman's method of generating texts is designed 
to capture, embody, and demonstrate the very ineptitude of writing, the 
awkwardness of being. In what he now refers to as his earlier, more "rigorous 
Ontological-Hysteric style" (Foreman 1987:128), he would select the textual 
material for his performances from jottings in his ongoing notebooks, many of 
which were intentionally written in a sort of "twilight" state, and which he 
allowed to become punctuated with intermittent sleep, taking them up again 
later-without re-reading--in a process of repeatedly "beginning again" (which 
he adapted from Gertrude Stein), until, as he rather cavalierly explained in a 
1977 essay (reprinted later in Reverberation Machines): "At a certain point I 
pick up one of my notebooks, look casually through it and decide 'Hum . . . go 
from here to here and I have a play"' (1985:238).3 
In their first, "notebook" materialization, the texts include drawings and 
diagrams as well as marginal extra-textual notes to himself of which he 
provides immediate textual examples. But he has commented that: 
I have not the slightest hesitation at any point to a) directly 
contradict any of my theoretical notes in any way whatsoever that 
comes to me, and b) accept and include anything that comes to me 
arbitrarily for any reason from any source (1985:242). 
What these "archeological records" (as he has called them) do not contain 
at this point is any consistent (if indeed any at all) indication of character, 
assignment of "lines" to eventual "speakers." This occurs in the next step, that 
of typing the original manuscript, of transforming "a concrete physical 
object . . . the encrustation of a history of 'marking'--of INSCRIBING mind 
into matter" into the "digital, bodiless form [of the typed text] which only the 
staging will return to concrete physical reality" (1985:237). 
Foreman has described this aspect of his process in a manner which is 
suggestive as a contemporary analog of the k'ai-ho aesthetic of the enlightened 
Taoist poets, who sought to embody in their texts the fluctuating contraction 
and expansion of consciousness (mirrored in the complementary disciplines of 
concentrative and absorptive meditation), which was designed to allow the poet 
to disappear from the poem and present the reader with an unmediated 
(except of course by language) experience of that which inspired the poet to 
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write (Chang 1963:9). Foreman has noted that the "mediating 'typed' text is 
an important step which takes away from the original fullness, so that a void 
of sorts is created, which will then evoke the necessary 'filling action of the 
staging" (1985:237). He continues to mediate and re-mediate his text by next 
deciding what portions of it will be prerecorded on audio tape (usually most 
of it), taping his own voice and those of his actors, and then subtly inserting 
(somewhere between logically and accidentally) the copious thuds, thumps, 
pings, boings, and buzzes, and the diverse musical fragments which aurally 
texture his performances. He then stages the piece to that score, not so much 
logically (as if that were still possible at this point), but rather "frnco/age-ically," 
using (as Brecht suggested) "the bricks that are there," i.e., whatever materials 
and resources that present themselves at the time.4 
Mediating mediation 
There is a theory of performance in all of this, or at least an issue in 
performance theory, which has recurred throughout the history of theater: the 
idea of unmediated experience. To understand the mechanism of most 
attempts to "get at" unmediated experience, it is helpful to consider the double 
negative inherent in the concept of "unmediated." Given the mediation of the 
original fall—into sin and/or language, depending on your point-of-view-any 
attempt at reconstituting that preceding state (if we posit its existence) is 
inevitably an undoing of something undone. Art (if and when it aspires to 
this), which is itself a mediating agent, is not unlike—in functionality if not 
intensity-the mediating force of, e.g., the grace of Jesus that "saves" the born-
again, or the whack of the Zen master's staff (a suspiciously phallic 
instrument) that brings satori to the disciple; all are attempts to mediate 
mediation. In a constellation of actions that could be viewed as (at least) a 
triple negative, i.e., mediating the mediation of mediation, Foreman attempts 
to foreground mediation itself. 
Focusing on writing as an agent which mediates consciousness, Foreman 
seeks to develop an extended form of writing which mediates itself in the act 
of mediating consciousness, which, if it doesn't exactly create unmediated 
experience, it does (in a certain sense) deconstruct his own consciousness and 
reveal some of the ideologically imposed preconceptions which mediate his 
experience. 
Knowing that he cannot-as in the aspiration of the Taoist 
poet-disappear, as a constituted and constituting subject (to which his 
conspicuous presence at his Ontological-Hysteric performances, continuing to 
mediate even then, may have attested), knowing that he cannot disappear 
because he is always already not there, in the sense of a cohesive and coherent 
whole, cannot entirely slip through the many holes in his text, but can only 
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awkwardly trip over his own irregularities (the seams of his art as of his 
consciousness, which he leaves exposed), Foreman seems to be trying, in that 
very stumbling, to trip up the illusion of our own cohesion and coherence and 
to make us aware (if we care to notice) that our own slip is showing. 
The third meaning 
Another way of viewing this is to apply to Foreman's theater a concept 
that Barthes has used in a preliminary gesture toward the deconstruction of 
film (and film, we should note in passing, especially the independent American 
cinema, supplied Foreman with a positive aesthetic model that theater could 
not). We could see Foreman's theater as an attempt to foreground what 
Barthes-in an essay of this title-called "The Third Meaning." In his analysis 
of some stills from various films by Eisenstein, Barthes distinguished three 
levels of meaning: the first is an informational level, the level of 
communication; the second is a symbolic level, the level of signification-of 
"meaningfulness" beyond the basic "meaning" of the first level; and a third level 
of meaning that resists, even defies definition because "it outplays 
meaning—subverts not the content but the whole practice of meaning" 
(1977:62). Barthes (it is important to remember) discovered the third level of 
meaning only by studying the still, where—for him—Eisenstein could be seen 
to have injected it into the dominant informational and symbolic levels. By 
contrast, Foreman—who makes abundant use of the tableau, a theatrical analog 
of the cinematic still-can be seen as intentionally suppressing these first and 
second levels of meaning in an attempt to foreground the third, which Barthes 
says acts on the level of signifiance, the field of signifiers rather than 
signification (1977:54). Foreman typically employs a wide variety of reframing 
devices tô indicate the play of meaning within the field of signifiers which 
comprises his performances. By repeatedly shifting the context in which they 
are embedded or the perspective from which they are viewed, he reframes 
objects, people, actions, words, ideas, and the performance itself, thereby 
focusing more on the process of generating meaning than on any fixed 
meaning itself.5 
Accepting even its pejorative connotation, Barthes refers to the third 
meaning as "obtuse": 
The obtuse meaning appears to extend outside culture, knowledge, 
information; analytically, it has something derisory about it: opening 
out into the infinity of language, it can come through as limited in 
the eyes of analytic reason; it belongs to the family of the pun, 
buffoonery, useless expenditure. Indifferent to moral or aesthetic 
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categories (the trivial, the futile, the false, the pastiche) it is on the 
side of the carnival. Obtuse is thus veiy suitable (1977:55). 
This third meaning possibly loses some of its derisory quality by being thrust 
into the foreground (an operation that we should only conceive of 
metaphorically), and Foreman would object to Barthes' emptying it out of any 
aesthetic or moral efficacy. But a note to himself in his first manifesto 
suggests that something like Barthes1 obtuseness is just what he chooses to 
focus on: "Make everything dumb enough to allow what is really happening to 
happen'' (1976:77). 
Barthes' definition, in The Third Meaning," of the contemporary problem 
as "not to destroy the narrative but to subvert it" (1977:64) is in theoretical 
alignment with that aspect of the Theater of Images project. And his assertion 
that the third meaning "subverts not the content but the whole practice of 
meaning" (62) could serve as an apt description of Foreman's theater. 
Mimesis and isomorphy 
Another aspect of Barthes' analysis of the third meaning can be fruitfully 
thought in relation to Foreman's practice. In acknowledging that the difficulty 
of describing it arises from its being "a signifier without a signified," Barthes 
says: "If the obtuse meaning cannot be described, that is because, in contrast 
to the obvious meaning, it does not copy anything" (61). The reference here 
to the act of "copying" (or not copying) opens up the possibility of an inquiry 
into whether Foreman's theater~in its foregrounding of the third, obtuse 
meaning—is mimetic. 
Marranca has described the Theater of Images as a "radical refunctioning 
of naturalism" (1977:xiii) and Foreman has written of the "REALISM" of his 
theater, which he immediately qualifies as seeming "unreal to most people" 
(1976:138), and these two concepts, realism and naturalism, are intimately 
bound up with the concept of mimesis. Whether or not we conceive of the 
Theater of Images in general, or Foreman's work in particular as mimetic 
depends not only on how we think of mimesis (and of theater) but also on how 
the theater "thinks" mimesis. It appears that an essential aspect of the 
theater's "theatering everything down" is that the theater "thinks" mimetically. 
As semiotic analysis of theater has sought to demonstrate, even when the stuff 
of "real life" is brought on stage, it is emptied out of its materiality, of that 
which corresponds in "real life" to a potential signified, and becomes merely 
a signifier. The theater, a semiotician would say, "semiotizes" everything. 
Even in its least tangible dimensions (and perhaps precisely there), theater 
may be inescapably mimetic. As Herbert Blau has pointed out in "Universals 
of Performance," there may be no "kind of performance that is non-mimetic, 
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since what is being performed is . . . an image of perfection in the head" 
(1987:178-9). In Foreman's case, we may grant that this image is recognized 
as im-perfect, as is the process by which it becomes embodied in performance, 
still, some kind of "image of perfection" constitutes Vhat is being performed11 
in his theater. 
In a passage from his third Ontological-Hysteric manifesto, which 
comprises, perhaps, his most comprehensive statement of intent, Foreman 
indicates the realm from which his image of perfection derives: 
The task of art is to serve understanding . . . by trying to create a 
field which is isomorphic with what 
stands-under 
experience—which is not experience itself. 
Now, what stands-under experience cannot be experienced, 
experience is not the mode by which we can know it. 
What stands-under experience are the laws (processes) of perception 
and other laws-of-configuration of the universe. 
My task is to make work, the structure of which is isomorphic 
with those laws. 
Then I will be 
standing-under 
experience. 
Then the work will be an ACT of understanding (1976:188). 
If Foreman does not speak here of mimesis, he does speak of isomorphy, 
which, in the theater, may be the very same thing. While Foreman argues that 
his art is "in no sense a mirror or representation—but a parallel phenomenon 
to life itself (1976:73), still, once he places this phenomenon on stage—as 
opposed, e.g., to applying for a patent for it, as for an invention—once he 
announces its existence as performance (like California performance artist 
Chris Burden announcing his disappearance, who can then no longer merely 
disappear but must—in a sense—imitate his disappearance), once Foreman 
subjects his isomorphic phenomenon to the specularity of an audience (even 
if that audience is only himself), it becomes mimetic.6 
Admittedly, Foreman's "isomorphy" is a special kind of mimesis, a kind 
which corresponds—with a necessary stipulation-to one of the categories which 
comprise what Marxist aesthetician Stefan Morawski, in his Inquiries into the 
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Fundamentals of Aesthetics', has distinguished as the "three great traditions" of 
mimesis, i.e., 
the Platonic (representation of appearances, or of what is sensuously 
given in reality itself), the Aristotelian (representation of the 
essences of things), and the Democritean (representation of the 
actions of nature) (1974:204). 
Without pausing to quibble (in dialectic oscillation) about Morawski's typology, 
we can see, I think, that Foreman's work fits best in his last category, that of 
Democritean mimesis. While Morawski goes on to point out that the 
"representation of the actions of nature" is central to the project of 
structuralism as practiced by Lévi-Strauss and Barthes (204), the stipulation 
which must be posited to allow Foreman's work a more adequate typological 
match with Democritean mimesis indicates the poststructuralist orientation of 
Foreman. To apply to Foreman's theater, Morawski's concept of 
"representation" must be able to embrace Foreman's brand of "isomorphic" 
representation, which, like Lévi-Strauss' "mythomorphic" discourse on myth, 
"must" (as Derrida has written) "have the form of that of which it speaks" 
(1978:286). 
If Barthes description of the "indescribable" third meaning as "not 
copying] anything" seems to qualify it as nonmimetic, he elsewhere refers to 
it as "the representation of that which cannot be represented" (1977:64), not 
simply "that which cannot be represented" but "the representation of that which 
cannot be represented." As mimesis, then, Barthes' third meaning—especially 
if conceived of as the "subject" of Foreman's theatrical discourse, that which 
he seeks to foreground-is suggestive of the Derridean "enigmas of the 'first 
time' and of 'originary repetition'" (1978:202). 
Writing as Performance 
Despite the full range of his auteurAal accomplishment~as director, as 
designer, and even as stage-manager—it is important to recognize that 
Foreman is first and last a writer: his theater begins and ends as writing. In 
his essay on "Freud and the Scene of Writing," Derrida traces the development 
in Freud's thought of writing as a metaphor for memory. This metaphorics of 
writing assumes vast importance for Derrida, because in his analysis~if not 
explicitly in Freud's—memory "is not a psychical property among others; it is 
the very essence of the psyche" (1978:201). Derrida describes the relationship 
of writing to psyche in Freud's model as one in which, "Psychical content [is] 
represented by a text whose essence is irreducibly graphic [and the] structure of 
the psychical apparatus [is] represented by a writing machine" (1978:199). 
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Developed slowly over some thirty years, Freud's modeling of psychic structure 
and process on writing reached its fullest expression in his "Note on the Mystic 
Writing Pad" (1974). The mystic writing pad, or Wunderblock, now a common 
child's toy, resolved for Freud a continuing difficulty in representing psychic 
functioning as a form of graphic inscription by presenting him with a "writing 
machine" which simultaneously provided the unlimited capacity for 
reception-corresponding to perception-with a potential for infinite 
preservation-corresponding to memory. For Derrida, of course, involved in 
the rehabilitation of writing, the door of this metaphor swings both ways: if 
psychic functioning can be seen as writing, writing can be seen to represent 
psychic functioning. Conceiving of writing in this fashion suggests some 
interesting insights into Foreman's work. 
From the beginning, Foreman's generative process is an attempt to 
produce a writing other than normative, other than what Derrida suggests "we 
believe to be designated by the proper sense of the word~a script which is 
coded and visible 'in the world'," a writing other than a mere "metaphor of 
psychical writing" (1978:209). Recognizing, however, that no two-dimensional 
transcription of this "other-ness" of writing (regardless of the twilight 
maneuvers through which he seeks to capture it, or the repeated tactics of 
"beginning again and again," or the inclusion of drawings and diagrams) can 
ever hope to transcend its mere metaphoric relation to psychic writing, 
Foreman submits that two-dimensionally transcribed "archeological record" to 
his own pseudo-alchemical filtering mechanisms (of typewriter and tape-
recorder) and transmutes it into the four dimensions of performance, hoping 
that there he can materialize what he's really after-psychic writing itself: what 
Derrida has referred to as "an original form of writing which puts words on 
stage without becoming subservient to them . . . a model of writing irreducible 
to speech which would include, like hieroglyphics, pictographic, ideogrammatic, 
and phonetic elements" (1978:209). In seeking to stage "what's going on in his 
head while writing," Foreman uses the stage as a kind of analog to Freud's 
"Mystic Pad" in an apparent attempt to stage "the scene of writing" itself. 
Performance is the necessary vehicle of this project; in its third dimension 
it allows for the "space of writing, its extension and volume, reliefs and 
depressions," as Derrida has written, and in its fourth dimension it allows for 
the "time of writing" (1978:225).7 
In a perceptive article about Foreman's scenography-which he aptly and 
(etymologically) correctly refers to as "scenic writing"-Guy Scarpetta says that 
"Foreman explodes the classical opposition between . . . [among other things] 
scénographie space and spectacular time" (1984:23). Foreman not only 
temporalizes the spatial, i.e., normally the visual, aspects of theater-by 
continuously transforming the space and all it contains, ceaselessly shifting 
perspectives, altering both the physical and psychical points of reference-he 
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also spatializes the temporal, by, e.g., physically redistributing in space (with 
the aid of a sophisticated sound system) the purely temporal, i.e., the aural, 
elements of performance. Writing of the confluence of time and space at the 
scene of writing, Derrida describes what may be seen to resemble, in an ideal 
state, Foreman's theater: 
Temporality as spacing will be not only the horizontal discontinuity 
of a chain of signs, but also will be writing as the interruption and 
restoration of contact between the various depths of psychical levels: 
the remarkably heterogeneous temporal fabric of psychical work 
itself. We find neither the continuity of a line nor the homogeneity 
of a volume; only the differentiated duration and depth of a stage, 
and its spacing (1978:225). 
Such is Foreman's theater, or at any rate, such was the older, more 
rigorous Ontological-Hysteric style: an attempt to render performance in "the 
form of that of which it speaks," to stage "what [was] going on in [his] head 
while writing," to make his theater isomorphic with "the scene of writing," or 
with Barthes' third meaning, "the representation of that which cannot be 
represented," or with Foreman's own "laws (processes) of perception and other 
laws-of-configuration of the universe"--a theater practice in fundamental 
alignment with current deconstructive modes of thought. 
If, for the purposes of this re-viewing of the corpus of his work, I have 
found it necessary--in an admittedly humanistic gesture-to disinter the author 
in the process, I hope that both you and Mr. Foreman (may he rest in peace) 
will forgive me. 
College of St. Benedict, St. Joseph 
Notes 
This essay was developed in part during a 1987 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer 
Seminar for College Teachers in Performance Theory, and was presented-in considerably different 
form-as "Richard Foreman: Writing As Performance, " to the Alternate Theatre Conference at the 
University of Alberta, 1988. 
1. In a discussion following the seminar presentation of the first version of this paper, when 
I mentioned Foreman's notion of his theater as a "perpetual motion machine,*1 Herbert Blau 
suggested that one might explore the correlation between such a notion and the "desiring 
machine" of Deleuze and Guattari (1977). The description that Foreman offers of his machine, 
however, as 
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not to do something to audience, but that makes itself run on new fuel. . . . Most 
machines (art) run on audience fuel~(Man's piggish desire to be at the center, to 
be made to feel there is "caringness" built into the world: old art manipulates that, 
tries to get a response: fuel is DESIRE in that case. FIND A FUEL OTHER 
THAN DESIRE! (1976:75), 
suggests that what he has in mind is more of an "anti-desiring machine," or, perhaps, more along 
the lines of what Blau himself has suggested as "a system running on alternate currents between 
the 'desiring machine' of the Anti-Oedipus and the 'debraining machine' of Ubu Roin 
(1987:190)-such alternating currents being suggested by Foreman as well, in the title of his 
collected later plays and essays, Reverberation Machines (1985). 
2. Foreman's procedure for adding recorded sound and music to his productions illustrates 
one manner in which he activates his "subtle insertion between logic and accident." He buys lots 
of unusual musical recordings and makes tape loops out of them, sometimes at the wrong speed; 
he also makes his own recordings of various unusual sound effects, like pennies tossed into an 
empty glass bowl, often making loops of these as well. Then in a method that's neither entirely 
random nor terribly deliberated, he selects which tapes will accompany which pages of text, but 
these selections may change—again, neither randomly nor with great deliberation—during the 
staging. During the staging of Vertical Mobility, for example, Foreman told the performers he 
would add a "boing" as a cue to change their positions. Until the necessary sound effect was 
taped, he shouted "cue." The "boing" was never added; his shouting became a part of the 
performance (Davy 1974:36). 
3. Since Film Is Evil, Radio is Good in 1987, he has loosened up his earlier "rigor" to allow 
rewrites, creating work which—as Richard Schechner noted—is "much more organized thematically 
than [his] other work." As Foreman explains it: 
Film Is Evil was totally different . . . in rehearsal, a good 30 per cent of the play was 
added. . . . Many speeches were rewritten, amplified. In rehearsal I cut a lot—at 
least half of what I started with-and rewrote the rest. I'd estimate that 30 to 50 per 
cent of the words were created in rehearsal (Foreman 1987:125). 
4. As Kate Davy reported in "Foreman's Vertical Mobility and Pain(T)n in the June, 1974 
issue of The Drama Review: 
In all of his technical work, Foreman aims for bricolage.. . . Before and during the 
rehearsal period, [he] devised several uses for a large quantity of white sheet 
material. It was used to make the curtains that comprised the basic setting, and it 
covered the long, narrow table, pyramids, and other objects throughout both plays. 
Rhoda wore it as a headdress that trailed on the floor. In Vertical Mobility, a ghost 
costume, a toga, a nightgown and nightcap were made from it. A stage direction at 
the end of Pain(T) reads "Enter people under white sheets." These costumes 
resembled Ku Klux Klan outfits with tall, pointed hats and masks, all made by 
Foreman from the same white material (1974:32). 
5. In consonance with my comparison of Barthes' analysis of the "third meaning" in cinema 
and Foreman's work, James Leverett's comments in "Richard Foreman and Some Uses of 
Cinema" appear particularly apt. Focusing on his use of framing devices in Book of Splendors: 
Part II (Book of Levers) Action at a Distance (1977), Leverett contrasts Foreman's purpose to that 
of Eisenstein: 
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At one point during Book of Splendors, the spectators are invited to complete 
a simile: A stick of wood found in an actor's pocket is like a. . . . Before the 
equation can be completed, however, two naked men are wheeled rapidly out on 
stage and a grotesque hunchback starts to diagram the figure of speech on a 
blackboard (another "frame"). The audience is trapped in mid-simile, and a complex 
set of responses-to comparisons, to incomplete comparisons, to the interruption 
caused by nudity [another type of "reframing" device-as he later explains-which 
throws "the viewer into the midst of his or her own reactions as it disrupts all other 
mental process by its intervention"], to a hunchback writing (possibly useful) 
information on a blackboard-is brought into high relief. The basic mental action 
of comparison is estranged and shattered into a number of components which are 
forced to coexist in a state of mutual disputation. The entire process is thus forced 
open for examination (an action perhaps not unrelated to the piece's partial title 
"Book of Levers"). . . . 
All of these framing methods can certainly be compared to the fundamental 
framing nature of cinema. They can also be related to the techniques of montage. 
Wylie Sypher paraphrases Eisenstein by defining montage as a complex of composed 
images "seen together, or nearly together, in a compound image." However, whereas 
the montage served Eisenstein as a "polyphonic structure [which] achieves its total 
effect through the composite of all the pieces as a whole," Foreman, as may be noted 
in the simile sequence already described, keeps the various components discrete in 
order that the spectator himself may examine the multiplicity of ways in which the 
parts do or do not fit together. The emphasis for Eisenstein is on a whole of 
orchestrated parts; for Foreman it is on the orchestration itself (1978:11-3). 
6. Jill Dolan, in her perceptive critique of Foreman in The Feminist Spectator as Critic 
(1988) argues against Foreman's assertion that his art is "in no sense a mirror or representation" 
by maintaining that: 
any extended series of events happening in a space as tightly controlled and carefully 
constructed as Foreman's theatre is indeed a representation. Whether the events 
on stage represent what he calls the "flickerings" of his consciousness, an aesthetic 
idea, or a narrative construct, they are arranged to be seen as a heightened form of 
reality. The performers are behaving in a particular way during a period of time for 
a particular reason. Entering the liminal theatre space, they represent something; 
they are not simply presenting themselves. They remained framed by the 
representational apparatus (46). 
7. Foreman actualizes this project by not only incorporating writing directly into the 
scenography, objectifying it in the form of signs and projected legends, but also by having words 
become actual objects, "properties" which figure in the action, as this excerpt from Pain(T) 
demonstrates: 
(The word "mean" cut out of pieces of wood is carried on 
stage-each letter a separate piece. The word "painter"-each 
letter a separate piece of stuffed soft material is also carried 
on. Then Rhoda enters with an easel.) 
VOICE 
Oh Rhoda, try stuffing the word painter up your ass. 
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RHODA 
It's too big a word (1968:198). 
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